This study analyses the differences in content and procedure in the application of political criteria and political conditionality in the EU accession processes of Slovenia and Croatia. The 
Introduction
In their attempt to theorize EU enlargement, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002) clustered together EU enlargement studies more than a decade ago by whether they deal with individual member states' enlargement politics or with EU enlargement politics. They showed that EU enlargement studies had focused predominantly on the enlargement from the perspective of the EU itself (considering substance) or dealt with case studies and circumstances of individual member states' paths to the EU. Unfortunately, researchers have since still not given much attention to the development of a more micro aspect, i.e. the EU accession process from the perspective of applicant states, let alone offered comparative analyses. This is duly noted by Noutcheva (2012, Chapters 4 and 5) , who studies EU enlargement as a Europeanization process and delineates between the policy of EU conditionality (the substance of accession conditions) and the politics of EU conditionality (the procedure in the accession process).
The Treaty on European Union (TEU) refers to these two aspects of EU enlargement in Article 49. The substance of the conditions to be met by the applicant state reads: "Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them /.../ The conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the European Council shall be taken into account." The procedure to be followed in the conditions' implementation and for the accession to enter into force is described as: "The applicant State shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the consent of the European Parliament, which shall act by a majority of its component members. /.../ The conditions of admission /.../ shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional from previously communist political and socialist economic systems to EU standards, the Copenhagen and Madrid European Councils formulated in 1993 and 1995, respectively, the wordings of more precise conditions to be fulfilled by applicant states. The conditions were set as: a) political criteria (stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities), b) economic criteria (a functioning market economy, as well as the ability to cope with the pressure of competition and the market forces at work inside the Union) c) the ability to assume the obligations of membership, in particular adherence to the objectives of political, economic and monetary union (European Council, 1993) and d) administrative criterion in the sense that accession countries had to provide sufficient legal and administrative capacity in order to incorporate the acquis communautaire (European Council, 1995) . This article focuses on the application of political criteria as the EU legal framework on human rights has been in intensive development also independently of the enlargement policy 1 and also due to the fact that the transition of political system to achieve performance of democratic, stable institutions entails essential preconditions for successfully meeting other criteria, most evidently the administrative criterion and ability to assume obligations of membership.
Regarding the procedure, the above primary legislation describes the first and the final phase (application and ratification) of the accession process as being dominated by EU member states (and with the consent of the European Parliament) but does not refer to the details of its second phase -the negotiations. The latter is dominated by the Commission, which does not act only as an opinion-maker in the beginning of the accession process (when the assessment of preparedness of an applicant state is provided) but as the central body for administration and content during the negotiation process (Barnes and Barnes, 2010) . Thus, the Commission 1 In general, it was the particular provisions of the Maastricht TEU that gave new impetus for the recognition of political rights through the political integration of the Union (TEU, Arts. 8-8e referring to the Citizenship of the Union). However, despite the European Council's newly provided EU accession criteria in 1993 and 1995, the 'enlargement article' in the subsequent 1997 Amsterdam TEU nor further amended Nice TEU did not include reference to them. Nevertheless, Amsterdam TEU provided an additional criterion only in the field of political criteria, i.e. that the applicant European State needs to "respect the principles set out in Article 6(1) TEU" (TEU, Art. 49), and inter alia gave the authority to the European Court of Justice in this field. This Article has substantially expanded in Lisbon TEU (Article 2) and is now much more all-inclusive, stating: "The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail. A second aim of the article is to address an important research gap in terms of analysing the application of political criteria and political conditionality in the EU accession process. It is characteristic of the criteria related to democracy and the rule of law that they are very difficult to measure objectively (Beurdeley, 2003) . For example, some of the EU's principles related to political criteria are inexistent in EU primary legislation (e.g. minority protection) or have only been formulated recently and have been changing due to new phenomena in the international environment.
Hence, the ambiguity in setting, interpreting and measuring political criteria provides apt opportunity for the EU to perform its most successful external action strategy, i.e. political conditionality, which lays exactly in This indicates that serious violation of political accession criteria or additional conditions can lead to negative conditionality and according to Pridham (2005, p. 56) even to the termination of negotiations. Nevertheless, it is quite surprising that there is a lack of comprehensive analysis on this topic (for exceptions see: Schimmelfennig and Schwellnus, 2006; Pridham, 2005; Mehikić and Šabič, 2008; Noutcheva, 2012) . This research aims to investigate on the one side the application of political EU accession criteria for applicant states in terms of substance and procedure, and on the other side the interpretation of the (in)adequate compliance with these standards and the setting of additional conditions in form of political conditionality.
Methodology
The method chosen to achieve the above aims is a comparative analysis of the application of political accession criteria and the use of political conditionality in the EU accession processes of Slovenia and Croatia. We expose cases in which political conditions represented big challenges, even brought the candidate states to be faced with negative conditionality and demanded long-term efforts to be successfully undertaken. The two states both gained independence by breaking away from the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and thus had a similar historical institutional (legal, political, economic and administrative) organization. (Jović, 2006; Šeperić, 2011 The substance of political accession criteria and the application of political conditionality
In the project of joining the EU, all the conditions for CEECs were primarily about the rule of law, democracy and human rights (Bučar and Brinar, 2002) . The importance of democracy was underlined on numerous 3 Details on this method are explained in the relevant section below.
occasions, in the opinions of the institutions, and in numerous declarations of the Council, Commission and the European Parliament as well as in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (Kochenov, 2004, p. 10 (Kochenov 2004, p. 13) : elections, the functioning of the legislature, the functioning of the executive, the functioning of the judiciary and anti-corruption measures.
The respect for human rights and minority protection were set in the EU's enlargement strategy for CEECs to prevent social exclusion and discrimination in post-communist societies. Despite the fact that it is one of the founding principles of the EU, there is a lack of acquis communautaire concerning protection of minority rights. Since the EU has not developed any minority standard to be applied to existing member states so far, there is a discrepancy between the internal and external application of the minority norm by the EU (Schwellnus, 2006, p. 187) . Non-discrimination is generally required as part of the EU acquis, but it is also specifically demanded to address minority problems in certain applicant countries, in particular with regard to the Roma population in CEECs (Schwellnus, 2006, p. 195) . Meeting the minority protection criterion especially pertains to the Slovenian and Croatian EU accession processes.
Political conditionality is regarded as a successful strategy of the EU enlargement policy applied since the 2004 enlargement accession process (Kochenov, 2004) . By making a highly attractive external incentive -the benefits stemming from membership -conditional on democracy, human rights, and peaceful conflict management, the EU has induced its would be members to conform to these political norms (Schimmelfennig, 2008) . Political conditionality ties a specific reward to fulfilment of defined conditions and is closely linked to the EU's self-definition as a normative actor (DeBardeleben, 2008) . Thus, political conditionality is a method used by the EU that promotes political norms and consists of positive and negative actions. The carrot and stick method works best when exercised in the advancement of membership and has to be credible in two ways:
it has to target countries' need to be certain that they are rewarded with significant steps towards accession (soon) after complying with the EU's political conditions, and that they will otherwise be excluded from EU membership (Schimmelfennig, 2008, p. 920) . In this study, we focus on the negative actions applied on the two countries, using the notion 'negative conditionality' as a pattern of conditionality application when candidate countries fail to meet the criteria -they are consequently denied assistance, association or membership, and are left behind in the competition (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005, p. 5) .
Since 1997, the Commission has regularly evaluated the political conditions in all candidate countries, exerting diplomatic pressure on them by means of annual opinions and Progress Reports. The Commission's approach to the political conditions has evolved considerably -over time it became more precise, prompted by the need to improve the analysis of the extent to which political requirements are met, which led to criticism of the first regular reports in 1998 (Pridham, 2005, p. 41) . The lack of clear methodology for objective cross-national comparisons between applicant states and ambiguity in the annual regular reports have contributed to a view that the EU was demanding higher political conditions of candidate countries when compared to member states (Pridham, 2005, p. 41) . Furthermore, this phenomenon can be problematic due to the EC's post-2004 application of the principle of 'differentiation', meaning that each applicant country progresses at its own pace according to its level of preparedness for accession; the Commission (2012, p. 3) also refers to it as the 'principle of own merits'.
The exercising of political conditionally by EU member states has been called 'a different kind of two-level game' (Šabič, 2002) , referring to the experience of CEECs in the Big Bang enlargement, e.g. when Slovenia had to face the leverage of Austria and Italy and concede to their bilateral conditions in exchange for their support for its EU accession.
Bilateral political conditionality has been present in enlargement process since its beginnings (e.g. French opposition to British accession in the 1960s). But as this analysis will show, additional political conditions may not only originate from the interpretation of Article 49 of the TEU but can derive from an opportunity especially for EU member states to turn their important unresolved bilateral issues with the applicant state into accession conditions with only a vague or no reference to the EU acquis.
Comparative analysis of the application of political accession criteria to

Slovenia and Croatia
The discussion in this section aims at elaborating the Commission's opinion on the Slovenian and Croatian applications for EU membership [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] , which is a 32 per cent lower frequency of reference. 5 The highest difference appears in the first two years of accession negotiations 5 Each year one Progress Report is issued, thus seven of them have been analysed for both states. The number under the column 'reference' indicates the number of times the term 'political criteria' is counted within the Progress Reports' texts.
when 'political criteria' are mentioned four times (both years) for Slovenia and 12 and 10 times per year respectively (22 altogether) for Croatia. Given that respect for minorities as a political criterion is particularly important to the analyzed research problem, we compare the frequency of use for the term 'minority/ies' in the two respective Reports. As shown in Table 2 , 6 the difference in frequency of reference to this political criterion between the two countries is even more explicit; the Commission's Progress Reports on Croatia mentioned the topic of minorities 356 times which is more than 300 per cent of the frequency in its Progress Reports on Slovenia (111 times). This can of course be explained by the difference in the de facto situation in practice as regards the respect of minorities in the two states, since the standard of minority protection in Slovenia has been viewed positively (Bučar, 1999, p. 342 ; see also argumentation below), whereas Croatia had trouble meeting the minority rights demands due to its "preoccupation with nation" and contested process of building a sovereign nation-state until the late 1990s (Boduszyński, 2013, pp. 45-6) .
6 Each year one Progress Report is issued, thus seven of them have been analysed in cases of both states. The number under the column 'reference' indicates the number of times the term 'minority/ies' is counted within the Progress Reports' texts. Further progress was expected but this was not conditioned on Slovenia's entry into the EU. In the last Progress Report before Croatia's closure of negotiations (European Commission, 2010) , the EC stated that Croatia had made good progress in the judiciary and fundamental rights, but enumerated the following nine areas -in reference to political criteria alone -where further progress was needed: judicial reform; protection of fundamental rights, especially minorities and refugees; infrastructure and equipment of courts; impunity for war crimes;
implementation of anti corruption sector issues; political accountability for corruption; public spending; enforcement of human rights. Although the number of pending court cases decreased slightly, the number of backlog cases has further increased" (European Commission, 2002, p. 22) . "/T/he integration of recognised refugees into society should be improved. /.../ Additional steps have been taken to further improve the protection of civil and political rights, but some issues continue to merit attention" (European Commission, 2002, p. 25) .
8 Judicial reform remains a major undertaking and significant challenges remain, especially relating to judicial efficiency, independence and accountability. Protection of fundamental rights has been strengthened but needs to be improved in practice, especially for minorities and refugees. Attention needs to be paid to integrating persons granted protection in Croatia and to protecting minors among irregular migrants. The infrastructure and equipment of courts, including case management systems, remains underdeveloped. Impunity for war crimes remains a problem. Further coordination and pro-active follow-up to the implementation of anti corruption sector issues are needed. A culture of political accountability for the corruption cases which are coming to light is lacking; preventive measures such as improved transparency in public spending need to be strengthened. Enforcement of human rights continues to be compromised by the persisting shortcomings in administration of justice, especially the length of proceedings
The EC assessed in its Interim report on Chapter 23 three months before the closure of negotiations that "further work remains to be done, in particular to establish convincing track-records in the field of the judiciary and the fight against corruption, to address impunity for war crimes and to settle the outstanding refugee return issues" and thus it "will continue to monitor Croatia's progress closely and to further support Croatia /…/ to enable it to meet the benchmarks in this chapter" (European Commission 2011, p. 7). Brozina (2012) 
A content analysis of the European Council Conclusions shows that, in
reference to Croatia, expressions such as "further reforms needed", "full cooperation with the ICTY" and "take necessary steps" were used four times, while none for Slovenia. In the European Council Conclusions (2011, p. 12), negative conditionality for Croatia is expressed. Along with the explanation that the "ongoing examination is being conducted in full respect of strict conditionality and in line with the negotiating framework", the European Council (2011, p. 12) on the basis of a proposal by the Commission refers to monitoring up to accession as a "necessary assurance to Croatia and current member states" and concludes the paragraph with a warning that it may otherwise, "acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, take all appropriate measures", meaning also to put a hold on the accession process. The same provision is included in the Croatian Accession Treaty to the EU (Title IV, Art. 36, point 1, Para1 and point 2). 
Comparative analysis of the application of political conditionality towards
Slovenia and Croatia
An analysis of the political conditionality exercised by the Commission and EU member states within the (European) Council illustrates the nature of political conditionality in the EU accession process. It is not necessary here to examine details of bilateral disputes or deeper motivations of member states. However, we do identify whether the condition set by the EC or a member state to a candidate state is related to the EU acquis (Table 4 , in white boxes) or it refers to other issues, mainly deriving from the interpretation of political criteria for membership or member states' bilateral demands from a candidate state (Table 4 , in grey boxes).
According to our thesis, if cases of EU acquis-related additional conditions
for Croatia prevail, the above established differentiation in applying political conditions more frequently and meticulously to Croatia can be attributed to the difference of the two states' starting points in the accession negotiations and their different pace of progress, Croatia's initial assessment being more difficult because of its post-conflict domestic conditions and regional demands for cooperation and reconciliation.
On the other hand, we presume that should cases of extra-acquis political conditionality prevail in the case of Croatia, this would lead to a conclusion that Croatia's EU accession path was affected by causes not pertaining exclusively to the country's own political will and performance in the accession process. The political conditionality applied to Slovenia and Croatia (left and right column respectively) during their accession processes is summarized in (Bučar, 1999, p. 343) . Italy also claimed poor protection of its minority in Slovenia but was again unsuccessful. It had been stated on several occasions by the Council of Europe's experts that the standard of minority rights for Italians living in Slovenia could in fact be taken as a role model in Europe (Bučar, 1999, p. 342 Slovenia to prove its Europeanness, Italy demanded the right of the first offer for ex-Italian property on Slovenian territory. In the eyes of the Italian government, this would be a 'European' answer to alleged injustices against the Italian population in post-war Istria (Bučar, 1999, pp. 344-5) . Hungarian national minorities in Slovenia (Šabič, 2002, p. 110) , but rather to protection under Article 61 referring to the right of expressing national affiliation. Additionally, Austria took issue with Slovenia's succession to one of the decrees adopted by Yugoslavia in November 1944, stipulating inter alia the nationalisation of all property of persons of German nationality, with the exception of those who fought in the Allied Forces or were neutral in the Second World War. Slovenia was of the opinion that denationalization, an ongoing process in Slovenia at the time, should not include restitution of property to Germans (Austrians). Austria decided on a double-track approach (Šabič, 2002, p. 112) . On the one hand, it was careful enough not to dispute the decree head on, given that such decrees could have been perceived by other EU members apart from Slovenia as being embedded in the current European order (as referred above, Italy had been previously unsuccessful in this regard). On the other hand, Austria shared its views about the possibly discriminatory practices of the Slovenian denationalization law with other EU members.
The second condition was that
In September 1999, the Commission effectively echoed the Austrian interests as it included denationalization on the agenda of accession negotiations with Slovenia, deciding that denationalization was not a subject of negotiations, but any proof of discrimination was, due to the general principle of non-discrimination applied in the EU (Šabič, 2002 , pp.
112-13).
Slovenia closed the Europe Agreement on 10 June 1996 and at the same time applied for EU membership; the accession negotiations began in April 1998. In the meantime, direct pressure was exerted by the European Commission on the Slovenian political leaders to abandon its 'away from the Balkans' foreign policy and reintegrate into the Southeast European The political conditionality imposed on Croatia by the Commission and by EU member states in the (European) Council is illustrated on the right side of Table 4 . The most important conditions brought forward by the Commission were: the establishment of minority rights, the right of refugee return, cooperation with the ICTY and cooperation with the neighbouring states (Boduszyński, 2013, p. 46) with special attention on post-conflict reconciliation (Drobnjak, 2012) ; all related to Croatia's domestic and Western Balkans post-conflict situation. The Croatian civil society and political elite were extremely sensitive to some of these additional conditions, as mentioned above, due to their importance in the ongoing nation-building process. An example of the negative sentiment in Croatia in response to this additional conditionality were in 2005 objections to the extradition of war-crimes suspect Ante Gotovina, arguing that Croatia should not surrender and let go of those who had helped defend the country during the war (Roter and Bojinović, 2005, pp. 50-1). As for additional careful monitoring of corruption, good governance and democratization, the EC (2012, p. 2) itself stated that the importance of "an increased focus on the areas of /strengthening the rule of law and democratic governance/ and further improving the quality of the process" is highlighted by "/t/he lessons learnt from previous enlargements". Brozina (2012) assesses that the experience gained in that "the EU insisted on specific reforms in the most criticized sectors and policy areas of the Bulgarian political system" (Noutcheva, 2012, p. 143) , namely the judiciary system, public administration, corruption and the treatment of the Roma minority, and that Bulgaria had shown substantial compliance, "important deficiencies in the quality of government remain even after EU accession" (Noutcheva, 2012, p. 157), 9 much extending the previous 2004 enlargement focus on mainly denationalization and minority issues (Brozina 2012) . The Commission realised that the above exposed areas demand more than a passing of law and require a longer period for full implementation especially as the latter was not based on any negative sanctions (Ibid.). This was taken into consideration in the case of Croatian accession negotiations as shown above with the invention of the monitoring mechanism during ratification. Another source (Anonymous, 2012) observes that in the Big Bang accession processes candidates were compared more to the successful 1995 enlargement in economic than in political terms.
Thus, only when they demonstrated poor performance in democratic governance after accession, the EC took this as an indicator to focus 9 Bulgaria is not an exception in this matter. For a study of 'democratic backsliding' in Hungary and Romania in 2012-13, see Sedelmeier (2014) .
more extensively on this area in the case of Croatia. Additional insight in this context is offered by Brozina (2012) , stating that a larger number of countries in Big Bang accession negotiations meant that EU institutions were mainly focused on a small number of key states (Poland, Czech
Republic and Hungary); as long as other candidates did not lag too much behind these three, the Commission had no reason to question their accession. In case of Croatia, no reference country existed.
Croatia first experienced political conditionality by EU member states 11 For more on the issue and its regional (post-Yugoslav) dimension, see Udovič (2011) .
12 It is however relevant to note that this agreement is not being respected by Croatia, as civil lawsuits against Ljubljanska banka and Slovenia at Croatian courts continue after its EU accession. Therefore, two new methods have been introduced for Croatia, namely benchmarks to assess progress during the negotiations and monitoring of the latter's implementation during the ratification process.
13 The areas of cooperation in the framework of this institution are: economic and social development; energy and infrastructure; justice and home affairs; security cooperation; building human capital, as well as cross-cutting issues such as parliamentary cooperation, media development, civil society activities and gender mainstreaming (Regional Cooperation Council 2014).
Conclusion
This article aimed to identify differences in the application of political criteria and additional political conditionality in the substance and in the process of EU accession of Slovenia and Croatia. We confirmed that the two EU institutions, namely the Commission (in its initial Opinion on the two states' application for EU membership and in the relevant Progress Reports) and the European Council (in its Presidency Conclusions) did refer to fulfilling political conditions more frequently and also more meticulously in the case of Croatia than in the case of Slovenia. Apart from the difference in frequency, extent of details in referring to political criteria, and the use of negative conditionality, we also established the differences in content and procedure in the application of political conditionality towards the two states. For both countries more cases of political conditionality were linked to issues not pertaining directly to the EU acquis but derived from demands unconnected to harmonization with EU law. In case of Slovenia, these were open bilateral issues stemming from the break-up of Yugoslavia.
In the case of Croatia, demands originating from the Stabilization and Association Process prevailed. As regards the procedural difference, all additional conditions were set for Slovenia early on, before the start of the negotiation process, while political conditionality was imposed on Croatia all along the accession process, even until the very end during the ratification process of its Accession Treaty. Additionally, the findings show that the Commission's additional conditions prevailed in the case of Croatia while EU member states' conditionality was predominant in the case of Slovenia. This points to a conclusion that during the Slovenian accession negotiations, the Commission acted as a relatively weaker institution, instructed by member states, while in the case of the Croatian accession negotiations, the EC had learned to act fully upon its powers, relied on a relatively easier internal decision-making procedure (rather than seek initial unanimity in the European Council) and predominantly posed accession conditions by itself.
Based on these three arguments, namely the prevailing extra-EU acquis conditions for Croatia, the application of political conditionality for
Croatia during the accession and ratification process and mainly by the Commission, we conclude that, compared to Slovenia, Croatia's experience shows that political conditionality was not being posed only according to the country's initial assessment of preparedness for EU membership, its own merits and performance in the accession Croatia's accession negotiations, the poor performance in rule of law and democratic governance in some of the new member states particularly raised concern in the EC regarding the EU's capacity to absorb weak states. Therefore, differences between Slovenia and Croatia in political conditionality derived not only from Croatia's difficult post-conflict domestic and regional context and the pace of its reforms, but also from the Commission's experience with previous enlargements, the institutional learning process, and the concern about the EU's absorption capacity.
These circumstances led the Commission to apply political criteria for the
Croatian accession more extensively and meticulously in comparison to
Slovenia, and set additional conditions to ensure that Croatia would have built the necessary capacities to perform well as a member state before it entered the EU. 
